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INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY, CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
ARGUMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERING
WITHOUT GLASSES
John C. Dehn*
Response to: Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010).
In Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, Trevor Morrison provides
valuable insights into the work of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
that scholars examining executive power or practice should thoroughly
consider.1 His previous work, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive
Branch, is required reading for those studying constitutional avoidance
doctrine generally, or its use in the executive branch specifically.2 In this
latest effort, Professor Morrison empirically demonstrates that OLC legal
opinions serve as a form of binding precedent for that office, and posits
that there are many good reasons for giving those opinions stare decisis
effect.3
As Professor Morrison recounts, the idea that Attorney General
opinions, and by extension those of the OLC, should be treated as a
form of binding precedent is an old one.4 Professor Morrison’s
* Assistant Professor, United States Military Academy, and J.S.D. candidate,
Columbia Law School. I thank Trevor Morrison, Mark Welton, Dan Rice, Rich Meyer,
Tim Bakken, and particularly Colonel Jody Prescott for their insights and advice, as well as
Philip Kehl for his excellent editorial assistance. Any remaining errors are my sole
responsibility. A West Point graduate, I have served for over 20 years in the Army in
various capacities as a commissioned officer, almost 13 of those years as a military lawyer
or judge advocate. The views presented here are mine and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Department of Defense, U.S. Army, U.S. Military Academy, or any other
government department or agency.
1. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L.
Rev. 1448 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis].
2. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 1189 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Avoidance].
3. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1455.
4. Id. at 1470–74 (discussing views of many nineteenth-century Attorneys General in
favor of adhering to prior Attorney General opinions).
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descriptive empirical examination provides a deeper understanding of
the publicly available factors influencing precedential adherence in the
OLC.5 His normative theoretical inquiry marshals an abundance of
prudential arguments in favor of the practice of adhering to such
institutional “precedent,” while proposing limited reasons for
“overruling” precedent and further echoing the call for increased public
disclosure of OLC’s work.6 Ultimately, Professor Morrison argues that
while “‘differences in approach’ from one head of OLC to the next are
insufficient to support a departure from precedent,” differences in
approach from one President to the next may, so long as the decision to
depart from precedent is publicly disclosed.7 “Differences in approach,”
in this context, appear to be differences in opinion on discrete legal
issues.
This response addresses only the normative theoretical inquiry and
makes one essential point: Professor Morrison’s analysis relies heavily
upon institutional considerations and potentially problematic OLC
perceptions of its role. He does not consider, and therefore potentially
undervalues, the proper effect of an OLC attorney’s individual ethical
and legal obligations. Potentially problematic OLC practices include its
identification of the opinion-requesting agency—the President and/or
the executive branch—as the client.8 This causes OLC, in Morrison’s
words, to view the law “through a particular lens,” and not to give “the
best view [of the law]” but “OLC’s best view of the law.”9 Other
institutional considerations, such as OLC’s legitimacy within the
executive branch,10 may also cause OLC to misidentify or to over-identify
with its client(s). These factors may generate consistent, executivefriendly error in OLC legal opinions. Such error diminishes the
interpretive value of OLC precedent, and thereby the propriety of
applying judicial stare decisis principles to OLC legal opinions.
This response briefly introduces how overvaluing executive branch
institutional interests and undervaluing individual obligations might
detract from Professor Morrison’s normative analysis. There are two
principle sources of individual obligations: constitutional and ethical.
First, all officers of the federal government are constitutionally obligated
to swear an oath, not to the branch, department, office, or official that
they serve or advise, but to “support” the Constitution.11 Subordinate
5. Id. at 1479–92 (identifying and analyzing factors influencing precedential
adherence in OLC).
6. Id. at Part III.
7. Id. at 1525.
8. See infra Part I (noting evidence of OLC’s tendency toward over-identification
with executive branch institutional interests and suggesting weaker attitude toward OLC
precedent might counter consequences of this tendency).
9. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1456.
10. See id. at 1496–97 (arguing credibility gains from adhering to precedent rather
than will of clients).
11. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution . . . .”).
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government officials are required to take such oaths by statute.12
Additionally, the executive’s obligations to “preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States”13 and to “take Care that the laws
be faithfully executed”14 also devolve upon subordinate executive branch
officials.15 Finally, all government attorneys, including Department of
Justice attorneys,16 have an ethical responsibility stemming from federal
statutes17 and their licensing authority’s codes of professional conduct to
give independent, competent, and candid advice.18 While further
analysis of the effect of these obligations in this context is needed, I here
outline concerns that might support removing the “lens” from OLC’s
view of both the law and its precedent. The natural tendency of this lens
is to distort OLC’s legal analysis. This tendency counsels against
observing stare decisis in the OLC.
It is important to note that while the theoretical space between
Professor Morrison’s position regarding stare decisis in the OLC and
mine is large, the practical differences in our views regarding the value
of OLC precedent is unclear and certainly narrower. In the end, our
differences may be more about the general attitude or obligations of an
OLC or government lawyer toward institutional precedent than the
particulars of whether and when to “overrule,” distinguish, or modify it.

12. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006) (prescribing oath for civil servants and uniformed
services to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic” and to “bear true faith and allegiance to the same”); 28 U.S.C. §
544 (2006) (requiring Department of Justice attorneys to swear oath to faithfully execute
their duties). I will not here address the legal distinction between “officers” of the U.S.
government and other subordinate officials.
13. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
14. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
15. See infra Part II (discussing extent to which individual constitutional oaths of
OLC or other executive branch officials relate to executive branch’s constitutional
obligations).
16. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2 (2010) (implementing 28 U.S.C. § 530B and providing that
“attorney for the government” includes “any attorney employed in . . . a Department of
Justice agency”).
17. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 530B (“An attorney for the Government shall be subject to
State laws and rules . . . .”).
18. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2010) (regarding duty of
competence); id. R. 2.1 (candid advice); id. R. 5.4 (professional independence). This was
the conclusion of the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility when
investigating what have been called the torture memoranda. See Office of Prof’l
Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of
“Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 24 (2009) [hereinafter
OPR
Report],
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (requiring attorneys who drafted and reviewed torture memoranda
to meet “the minimum standards of independent professional judgment, candid advice,
thoroughness, and care”).
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I. INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY AND THE RISK OF CLIENT OVERIDENTIFICATION
In practicing the craft of government lawyering, an attorney must be
acutely aware of the risk of over-identification with the client or
institution that she advises, as well as the potential for misidentification
of the client. In the worst case, a lawyer might over-indentify with a
misidentified client. This Part briefly notes evidence of OLC’s tendency
to over-identify with executive branch institutional interests, and how the
potential consequences of that executive-friendly tendency might be
countered by adopting a weaker attitude toward OLC precedent.
Professor Morrison’s description of OLC’s practices is quite familiar
to me and, I suspect, to many government attorneys. In my experience
as an Army lawyer, or “judge advocate,” almost every office providing
advice to a major military command element, from an Army division or
installation to the Department of the Army, maintained precedential or
historical files. Requests for legal opinions prompted a review of these
files for similar or related requests and the opinions issued. If the
particular office had previously issued a relevant opinion, it was
considered authoritative, not necessarily “binding.”
Disagreement with a prior opinion prompted a reexamination of its
legal rationale. Minor errors were usually corrected without review. Any
decision to significantly alter or repudiate a prior opinion required an
appropriate level of review and approval. Although this review was
almost always necessary when a change would counsel against action that
a previous opinion had permitted, simple legal error in the prior
opinion was usually sufficient to “overrule” it. Of course, the willingness
to supersede erroneous opinions and the manner by which such
decisions were communicated depended very much upon the
personalities of individual supervisory attorneys and the anticipated
response from the opinion-requesting entity. Unlike OLC, military
lawyers and legal offices are dispersed worldwide, which substantially
hinders development of a homogeneous understanding of institutional
precedent or an empirical examination of how it is treated.
A primary reason for adhering to “precedent” in the Army, as in
OLC, is the perceived legitimacy of the legal office providing the
opinion.19 Like in OLC, personnel turnover in military legal offices is
quite high—though career civil servants provide continuity and
institutional memory. A legal office will lose credibility with the entities
and individuals it advises if every change in personnel prompts a change
in legal advice.20 Of course, institutional legitimacy concerns can
19. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1496.
20. A secondary consideration in many Army offices, and possibly in OLC, is attorney
experience with the specific legal issues presented. Judge advocates are rarely assigned to
positions based on their demonstrated competence or past experience in a similar or
identical position. They are assigned to positions that will broaden their skills or range of
competence and experience and also measure their potential for promotion and
increased responsibility. Consulting precedential files and providing review by a senior
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sometimes be in tension with the duty to provide objective and accurate
legal advice. In some cases, lawyers might need to admit the errors of
predecessors in order to fully vindicate the duties and responsibilities of
their positions, including their ethical obligations of competent, candid,
and independent advice to or on behalf of their clients. The problem is
that in the Army, as in OLC, identifying the client is not as
straightforward as it might seem.
Army lawyers advise units, offices, or commands within the Army,
and sometimes joint (meaning multiservice) or multinational
commands. There is a natural inclination, due to otherwise appropriate
cultural norms of loyalty and subordination, to view these entities, their
commanders, or other principals as the client. This creates the risk that
military lawyers will over-identify with or take a vested interest in the
actual or perceived preferences of the entities or individual(s) they
advise. They may tend to shape their advice to their advisee’s preferred
decision, or to their own idea of what is a situational, advisee-friendly
view of the law. Any of these developments might undermine larger
Army organizational interests. For this reason, the Army formally
identifies its attorneys’ client as the “Army,” and not as the individual
command or entity to which an attorney is assigned, or as the
commander or other individual(s) she advises.21
Professor Morrison embraces a view of OLC that both permeates
and supports his normative analysis. By accepting at face value how OLC
alumni describe its role and client,22 he accepts that “OLC’s work should
‘reflect the institutional traditions of and competencies of the executive
branch as well as the views of the President who currently holds
office.’”23 He refers to OLC’s “clients” as “the White House, the Attorney
General, and the various departments . . . that seek its advice.”24 He
notes that OLC’s location within the executive branch means that “its
best view of the law might legitimately differ on some issues from that of
a differently situated actor.”25 And he cites James Madison for the
notion that each branch of government must affirmatively resist
encroachment by the others in order to preserve the separation of
powers.26 He then asserts that OLC lawyers “are players” in this process,
attorney help to develop inexperienced attorneys. In OLC, the use of precedent and
review by senior attorneys may serve a similar function.
21. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 27-26, Rules of Prof’l Conduct for Lawyers, app. B,
R. 1.13 (1992) (“[A]n Army lawyer represents the Department of the Army acting through
its authorized officials . . . [including] the heads of organizational elements within the
Army, such as the commanders of armies, corps and divisions, and the heads of other
Army agencies or activities.”).
22. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1452–54.
23. Id. at 1455 (quoting Walter Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of
Legal Counsel (2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:
Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1603 app. 2
(2007)).
24. Id. at 1496–97.
25. Id. at 1456.
26. Id. at 1499.
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and that “Madison’s vision of the separation of powers provides a lens
through which OLC provides its legal advice.”27
In spite of this evidence of institutional bias in legal interpretation,
and the candid statement that “the generally pro-executive tenor in
OLC’s opinions simply reflects that OLC is part of the executive branch,”
Professor Morrison does not believe that OLC acts as an “advocate” for
the President or the executive branch.28 For Professor Morrison, OLC’s
situational, executive-friendly “best view of the law” is “different from the
job of an advocate but also need not carry the pretense of ‘true’
neutrality.”29 Other OLC alumni share this view.30
This position seems tenuous. It is one thing for a lawyer’s
objectively-derived best view of the law to be that the law governing a
certain matter is ambiguous in certain respects, and to advise that a
course of action or policy is arguably consistent with the law, or at least
not clearly prohibited by it. This is no doubt often necessary in the OLC.
The Constitution marks “only its great outlines” and designates only
“important objects,” but “the minor ingredients which compose those
objects [must] be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”31
As Justice Robert Jackson observed, “[a] judge, like an executive adviser,
may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they
actually present themselves.”32 It is quite another matter, though, to
adopt an admittedly shaded or favorable situational interpretation of the
law that more affirmatively supports or defends a particular “institutional
tradition,” prerogative, or policy decision. Such an interpretation is
more like advocacy than objective advice.33 It is not spared from this
27. Id. at 1502.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Walter Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel
(2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1559, 1604–07 (2007) (“The advocacy
model of lawyering . . . inadequately promotes the President’s constitutional obligation to
ensure the legality of executive action.”); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency
34–35 (2007) (agreeing with Dellinger’s OLC principles).
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
33. It is important to distinguish between a “contextual” and “situational”
interpretation of the law, though it is a subtle distinction. From my perspective, the
former considers the application of the law to a given set of facts and circumstances in
light of the reason for which a lawyer’s advice is sought. It can be “client immaterial,”
meaning the identity and situation of the client is not necessarily an intrinsic or necessary
aspect of the legal analysis and advice. Situational legal analysis and advice considers a
client’s legal position vis-à-vis other potential actors. It is only appropriate when providing
advice to a client as such, in circumstances demanding a situational analysis.
This distinction is important for lawyers advising internal elements of organizational
clients. These internal components might have differing interests based on the internal
dynamics of the organizational entity, such as those I have articulated with regard to the
Army. While either contextual or situational advice may be objective in theory, the latter
is inherently less so in practice given the analysis of the client’s legal status against that of
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categorization by the fact that it is an executive branch “office’s best view
of the law”34 and not that of an individual attorney.35
Professor Morrison’s position appears largely based on his view of
the import of Madison’s separation of powers commentary to OLC’s
role. Madison stated, as Morrison quotes, that “the great security against
a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department,
consists in giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist
encroachment of the others.”36 Professor Morrison takes this to mean
that OLC should assist the executive in defending its institutional
prerogatives by interpreting the law through an executive lens.37
This conclusion does not necessarily follow. The right and duty to
interpret the law that the executive must faithfully execute is no doubt
part of its “constitutional means” of resisting encroachment,38 as is the
executive’s power to veto a proposed law in the first instance.39 However,
the need to prevent encroachment does not require an executivefriendly interpretation of the law. Only advice that fairly addresses and
objectively evaluates the scope, limits, and relationship of executive,
legislative, and judicial power is necessary.40 Objective advice can give
“the benefit of reasonable doubt as to the law”41 without espousing a view
of the law that affirmatively supports rather than merely allows a desired
course of action. Constitutional ambiguity will unquestionably require
OLC to extrapolate a great deal from available data, including from its

others. Professor Morrison would no doubt argue that the executive’s “situation” or
position within the government is necessarily a part of the context within which OLC must
interpret the law. This is a fair point, but one which assumes the identity of the client and
emphasizes the need for maintaining absolute objectivity in OLC legal analysis and advice.
The remainder of this Part discusses the potential dangers of situational rather than
contextual legal interpretation in the executive branch.
34. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1502 (citation omitted).
35. But see id. (indicating inattention to situation in which OLC, though not
engaging in advocacy, by rendering advice as an “office,” may invite erroneous calls for
OLC to be neutral decision-maker, and which “demands too much of OLC”).
36. Id. at 1499 (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 321–32 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
37. Id. at 1501.
38. The Federalist No. 44, supra note 36, at 282 (James Madison) (“[I]n case the
Congress shall misconstrue . . . the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its
true meaning, . . . the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary
departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts . . . .”).
39. See The Federalist No. 73, supra note 36, at 439–40 (Alexander Hamilton)
(stating veto power protects against laws that would violate President’s constitutional
prerogatives).
40. See, e.g., John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A
Conceptual Framework, Temp. L. Rev. at Part I (forthcoming Winter 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539257 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing Justice
Jackson’s Youngstown framework does not necessarily imply existence of a preclusive or
plenary core of Commander-in-Chief power and might simply address an incomplete
overlap of executive and legislative powers, to be discovered through careful analysis of
the nature of those powers).
41. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 35 (citation omitted).
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prior opinions. It would seem that only an attempt at true objectivity
might prevent this extrapolation from becoming purely presidentially
preferred or executive-friendly conjecture.
Professor Morrison attempts to assuage any concerns regarding this
institutionally-sensitive approach to legal interpretation by asserting that
OLC’s need to “defend its conclusions by means of recognized forms of
legal argumentation” and to “show that its views are not just plausible but
are indeed its best view of the law” will prevent “audacious” claims of
executive power.42 But former OLC head Jack Goldsmith observed that
“all OLC lawyers and Attorneys General over many decades,” for
Presidents of both parties, are “driven by the outlook and exigencies of
the presidency to assert more robust presidential power, especially
during a war or crisis, than ha[s] been officially approved by the
Supreme Court or than is generally accepted in the legal academy or by
Congress.”43 In the hands of a skilled lawyer, “recognized forms of legal
argument” are a tool for shaping or preserving a preferred view of the
law, not for objectively analyzing it. Nevertheless, Professor Morrison
suggests that observing stare decisis in the OLC “cuts both ways,”
meaning that it applies equally to precedent expanding and limiting
executive power.44 While this is true in theory, Goldsmith’s observation,
Professor Morrison’s Madisonian model, and Morrison’s related
suggestion that the executive branch may properly use the constitutional
avoidance doctrine in its legal interpretation for purposes of “selfprotection,”45 indicate that, in practice, only one side of the knife is
sharpened.46
42. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1502–03.
43. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 37. Professor Morrison also notes that “[w]e can
fairly predict that OLC will face great pressure to conform its views to those of the
President, and it is worth attending to those pressures.” Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra
note 1, at 1455.
44. Id. at 1503.
45. Morrison, Avoidance, supra note 2, at 1232. Professor Morrison accurately
describes the canon as requiring that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.” Id. at 1192 (citations omitted). The canon’s “self-protective” use in
interpreting constitutionally ambiguous powers is problematic because often it would
seem to require presuming the fact to be proved, that there is a “serious constitutional
problem” to be avoided while interpreting a statute delimiting executive power. By way of
example, one’s approach to interpreting a statute delimiting the nation’s conduct in war
might differ if one presumes (or recklessly interprets precedent to conclude that) the
President’s Commander-in-Chief power is entirely inherent and autonomous, and
therefore that any such regulation potentially raises a “serious constitutional problem.”
46. OLC insiders may object to this description of their role and approach. Professor
Morrison suggests that “[t]he in-between nature of [OLC’s] role can be ‘uncomfortabl[e]’
and difficult to specify in all its particulars, but that does not make it incoherent or
unattainable.” Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1502 (internal citation omitted).
Professor Morrison’s clearly superior knowledge of OLC practice may support this
observation. It would seem to be incumbent upon OLC alumni to better explain, or
perhaps demonstrate through public disclosure, how it “defends” executive branch
institutional interests without tending toward advocacy in the form of favorable situational
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Professor Morrison also asserts that judicial precedent resolving
issues of executive power by settled practice supports the observance of
stare decisis in the OLC,47 while recognizing that public and
congressional disclosure is important.48 Putting to one side the slightly
circular reasoning of this argument (because “settled” OLC precedent
coupled with presidential action and congressional acquiescence
becomes law in some cases, OLC precedent should be observed because
it is “a more central, constitutive part of what the law is”49), the fact that
the courts sometimes consider “historical gloss” when resolving
constitutional issues only serves to emphasize the importance of OLC’s
giving the best view of the law and correcting erroneous precedent.
Courts resort to settled historical practice on the belief that it
represents the good faith understanding of the elected branches, equally
sworn to uphold and support the Constitution, as to the constitutional
assignment or balance of power.50 If OLC consistently favors the
institutional and policy concerns of the executive branch and also
observes stare decisis, such gloss will come to represent not what the
Constitution permits or assigns, but what the executive branch has, over
time, found to be acceptable legal argument rather than correct legal
analysis. In the worst case, perhaps represented by the torture
memoranda, OLC opinions may reflect what a current administration
finds to be expedient legal argument supporting a predetermined policy
decision that is simply judicially and politically unchallengeable under
the circumstances.51 In any case, the gradual accumulation of executivefriendly precedent—especially when classified or otherwise publicly,
politically, and judicially unreviewable52—may incrementally expand
or “self-protective” legal analysis.
47. Id. at 1495–96 (noting efficiency gains by not treating each issue as one of first
impression and by viewing earlier OLC precedent as constitutional “gloss”).
48. Id. at 1499–500 (“Assertions of executive power that are kept secret from
Congress constitute evasions of [the separation of powers] checking mechanism . . . .”).
49. Id. at 1504.
50. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence
endorsed resort to settled practice when there exists “a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government.” 343 U.S. 579, 610–
11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327 (1936) (“[W]hile this court may not, and should not, hesitate to
declare acts of Congress . . . to be unconstitutional . . . an impressive array of legislation
such as we have just set forth . . . must be given unusual weight in the process of reaching
a correct determination of the problem.”).
51. See, e.g., Dehn, supra note 40, at 7 (“[C]laims of plenary commander-in-chief
power [are] more than a ‘persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy.’ They
sustain an ability to act in complete secrecy on a broad range of matters, avoiding political
discourse that might lead to controversy until a given matter is a fait accompli.” (citation
omitted)).
52. Professor Morrison recognizes that “many of the issues addressed by OLC are
unlikely ever to come before a court in justiciable form” and that therefore “OLC’s
opinions often represent the final word in those areas unless later overruled by OLC itself,
the Attorney General, or the President.” Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1451.
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claims of executive power and upset what Justice Jackson called the
“constitutional equilibrium.”53 A fair view of the available information is
that observing stare decisis in the OLC would, more often than not,
trend in this direction.
The OLC’s over-identification with executive branch institutional
interests, and the most likely effect of its over-identification, counsel
against observing stare decisis in the OLC. Objective analysis and
independent judgment can serve to correct any trends toward overly
expansive claims of executive power, while the mere existence of
precedent and a simple requirement to explain deviations from it should
curtail such claims in most cases (those not involving secrecy and
expedient legal argument). This discussion also implicates the possible
effect of constitutional obligations and professional responsibilities on
an OLC’s lawyer’s role, and on the identification of OLC’s “client.”
II. THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
The D.C. Circuit has observed that a government attorney’s oath
means that “[u]nlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a government
lawyer . . . cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.”54
This view is also supported by professional responsibility norms and
academic commentary. Diverse sources agree that the executive’s
constitutional oath and obligations are relevant to OLC’s advisory
function.
The Department of Justice’s Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) approvingly cited what is often called OLC’s Best
Practices Memorandum for the proposition that “OLC’s core function is
to help the President fulfill his constitutional duty to uphold the
Constitution and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”55
Commentators—frequently OLC alumni—agree,56 but understandings
of the legal and practical effect of this fact appear to vary widely.57 This

53. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
55. OPR Report, supra note 18, at 17 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
56. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal
Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 337, 351 (1993) (“[I]nsofar as the
[P]resident has the express responsibility to take care that the Laws including the
Constitution as the supreme law be faithfully executed, enforcing an invalid law would be
contrary to a [P]resident’s constitutional duty and oath.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney
General: A Normative, Descriptive and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 375,
380 (1993) (“[A] model of the Attorney General as opinion writer would begin with the
notion that he is aiding the President in carrying out the legal responsibilities, including
that of constitutional interpretation, with which the President has been entrusted by the
Constitution itself.”).
57. An exhaustive list is impractical here, but an excellent source collecting views on
the role of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, and OLC in this context is Robert C.
Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. Legal Prof. 39 (2009); see also McGinnis, supra note 56,
at 382–406 (comparing, contrasting, and critiquing various approaches Attorney General

2010

GOVERNMENT LAWYERING WITHOUT GLASSES

83

is perhaps a reflection of the varied approaches to lawyering in the
broader legal profession.58 This Part introduces how these constitutional
and professional responsibility obligations might counsel, and perhaps
even require, OLC attorneys to subordinate institutional interests and
prudential concerns supporting the observance of stare decisis to their
best view of the law.
Little commentary thoroughly examines the extent to which the
individual constitutional oaths of OLC or other executive branch
attorneys relate to or supplement the executive branch’s constitutional
obligations.59 A weak view might posit that they are largely superfluous
in a unitary executive already constitutionally obligated to “faithfully
execute” the law. Such a view would discount the apparent purpose of
constitutionally or statutorily requiring the oath from all executive,
legislative, and judicial officials—to ensure each federal government
official is loyal first to the Constitution rather than to her state, branch,
department, institution, office, official, or political party. Such oaths
might therefore have practical value for government attorneys, rather
than simply moral force.
Of many possible effects of the oath, one might be identifying the
client. The earlier-referenced OPR Report stated that the executive
branch is OLC’s client.60 Like the Army,61 it identified the client as the
larger organization within which an attorney is situated, rather than as
the departments, officers, or agencies she advises. An oath to support
the Constitution, however, undermines the notion that a government
lawyer’s professional responsibilities run to only one of the three
branches it creates. Thus, it might be said that an OLC lawyer’s client is
the Constitution, or, perhaps even more appropriately, the government
that it creates. Some have argued that a government lawyer’s client is
the rule of law itself.62
Accepting the view that the “government” is the client would place
OLC on roughly the same footing as corporate counsel. Whether
corporate counsel advise the chief executive officer, the board of
directors, a major corporate department, or a senior corporate officer,
their client is properly understood as the legal entity created by the
corporate charter, not as the officers, departments, or other individuals
and OLC should take to law and executive branch when giving legal advice).
58. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers 36–39, 80–83 (1996)
(discussing varying ideologies influencing legal profession, including those that overvalue
client interests).
59. See, e.g., Note, Without Lawyers: An Ethical View of the Torture Memos, 23 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 241, 267 (2010) (“A government lawyer, then, is obliged to consider more
than his client’s wishes. He is bound by his oath to uphold the Constitution and, by
extension, the laws of the Nation.”).
60. OPR Report, supra note 18, at 17 (“If the OLC fails to provide complete and
objective legal advice, it fails to properly advise its client—the Executive Branch.”)
61. See U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 27–26, Rules of Prof’l Conduct for Lawyers, app.
B, R. 1.13 (1992).
62. Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 175, 220 (2006)
(citation omitted).
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receiving their advice.63 The main difference in this context, of course,
is the relationship of the law to the “corporation.” In the context of a
private corporation, the law is extrinsic to the corporation and its
charter. In the government, the fundamental law is also the corporate
charter. It is therefore true that “[l]egal advice to the President from the
Department of Justice is neither like advice from a private attorney nor
like a politically neutral ruling from a court.”64 It would appear that the
closer it is to the latter, however, the better the “constitutional
corporation” and the rule of law that creates it are served.
Even assuming the client is properly identified as the executive
branch, another possible effect of the oath may be to more clearly
elevate a government lawyer’s obligations to the law above those owed
the client. All lawyers have professional responsibility obligations both to
the law and to their clients.65 They must sometimes decide difficult
questions of ethical duty where obligations to the law and to a client
might conflict.66 If the executive branch is an OLC attorney’s client, a
constitutional oath might serve to remind the attorney that the interests
of the law and not the client are paramount.67 As the OPR Report
stated, “[i]n order to effect its mission of providing authoritative legal
advice to the executive branch, the OLC must remain independent and
produce thorough, objective, and candid legal opinions.”68 This is
certainly the professional responsibility of every licensed attorney, but it
carries greater meaning and consequence for government lawyers
guiding the powerful arms of government and solemnly sworn to
support the fundamental law.
Observing either of these possible effects would seem to require
OLC to remove the lens through which it views both the law and its
precedent—to discard its executive branch glasses. While OLC must
undoubtedly assist the President to preserve the separation of powers, it
must do so only in ways that comport with the best view of the law. The
diversity of legal scholarship on what the law is indicates that the
ideological (or even neutrally derived) theoretical predisposition of OLC
63. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13 (2010) (outlining professional
responsibilities when representing an organization as a client).
64. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 35.
65. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. (“A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the
requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business
and personal affairs.”); see also id. R. 1.2(d) (stating “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client
to engage, or assist a client, in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,” but
may assist a client “to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning
or application of the law”); id. R. 1.16(a)(1) (mandating withdrawal from representation
that would result in violation of law).
66. Ann. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 102 (2007) (discussing various state rules
regarding disclosure of privileged client information to prevent crime or fraud, noting
some states permit disclosure while some require it in some circumstances).
67. See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy and the Rule of Law,
77 Fordham L. Rev. 1333, 1362 (2009) (“[Government l]awyers cannot understand their
role as merely executing their clients’ preferences; the distinctive function of lawyers is
that they act as agents of their clients, but only within the bounds of the law.”).
68. OPR Report, supra note 18, at 260 (emphasis added).
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lawyers may affect the consistency of OLC’s opinions. One hopes that
such predispositions will naturally subordinate to an OLC lawyer’s
obligation to provide objective, accurate, and independent advice,
though there are clear indications that this is not the case.69 In fact,
some commentary indicates that an executive branch lawyer’s
preexisting ideology or understanding of the law is replaced with OLC’s
executive-centric approach.70 Nevertheless, adherence to one’s oath of
office appears to require that the opinions of predecessors receive due
consideration, but ultimately that OLC give advice based upon the best
view of the law.71
Of course, arguments that one’s constitutional oath might require
her to overrule or ignore erroneous precedent are potentially just as
applicable to the judiciary. Judicial observance of stare decisis is
certainly “one of the main devices thought to constrain political and
ideological preferences within the Judicial Branch.”72 Because stare
decisis is not constitutionally mandated, there are plausible arguments
both for and against its propriety. It is, nevertheless, a constitutionally
derived form of judicial decisionmaking.73 Judicial opinions are, for
better or worse, a constitutional gloss that coordinate branches ignore at
their peril. OLC opinions are not, and should not be.74
While I agree with Professor Morrison that many considerations
supporting judicial stare decisis are “portable” to the executive branch,
this does not mean that those considerations carry the day. Institutional
69. See Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 34 (describing author’s selection as OLC head
as result of his legal “philosophical attunement” with key administration officials and
noting this attunement “would shape [his] legal decisions as the head of OLC”).
70. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Remarks at the 104th Annual Meeting of the
American
Society
of
International
Law
(Mar.
25,
2010),
at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[Executive branch attorneys] are expected to look to the previous opinions of
the Attorneys General and of heads of [the State Department Legal Adviser’s] office to
develop and refine the executive branch’s legal positions.” (emphasis added)); see also supra
note 23 and accompanying text (discussing institutional views which ought to guide OLC
lawyer’s work).
71. Indeed, it may be this fact alone that will prevent John Yoo from professional
disciplinary action. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1452 n.11 (citing OLC
memoranda finding Yoo’s views were held in good faith). This indicates both the strength
and weakness of accepting this view of a government attorney’s oath.
72. Id. at 1448.
73. I, like Professor Morrison, am quite sympathetic to the constitutional arguments
supporting stare decisis in judicial adjudication. See id. at 1492 n.174.
74. Professor Morrison may believe this statement to be descriptively false within the
executive branch given his view that OLC opinions are a “source of law” for that branch.
Id. at 1493. However, the point is that neither the judiciary nor Congress need accept
OLC’s view of the law, no matter how often repeated. Professor Morrison seems to agree
with this view. See id. at 1500–51 (noting longstanding disagreement between Congress
and presidency over congressional regulation of certain foreign affairs matters and
concluding “it should be permissible for OLC to give extra weight to longstanding
executive branch understandings of executive power unless and until the courts resolve
the matter in favor of Congress, or Congress takes some other measure forcing the
Executive’s acquiescence”).
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and practical realities are clearly different. Judicial opinions are (almost
universally) public, and result from an adversarial process intended to
prevent legal and factual error. The secrecy of much of OLC’s work, as
well as its insulated position in the executive branch and “special
sensitivity to incursions on executive power,”75 might tend toward the
development of dysfunctional norms and the perpetuation of executivefriendly legal errors.
This potential self-dealing problem, which
Professor Morrison acknowledges but perhaps too easily overcomes,76
ultimately weakens arguments in favor of observing judicial principles of
stare decisis in the OLC.
CONCLUSION
Professor Morrison makes a strong prudential case for the
application of judicial stare decisis principles to OLC legal opinions.
While institutional and other considerations play a role in the analysis of
this issue, misinterpreting
or overemphasizing institutional
considerations weaken the value of OLC precedent, and thereby the
propriety of adhering to it. Overemphasizing institutional concerns also
masks the important place of individual legal and ethical obligations in
the dialogue. A complete theoretical inquiry must more thoroughly
consider the import and effect of these individual considerations. Given
these individual obligations, “differences in opinion”—a good faith
finding of simple legal error after due consideration of precedent and
thorough legal analysis—might be sufficient to “overrule” OLC
precedent, and perhaps even demand it.
A personal story might serve to amplify this point and to reveal my
own potential bias. In 2004, only weeks before the public airing of
photos depicting abuse at Abu Ghraib, I was assigned as the new legal
advisor to two criminal investigations into late-2002 deaths of detainees
at Bagram, Afghanistan. These investigations produced evidence of
abusive practices surrounding the interrogation and internment of the
decedents and others. As I studied the law to determine the proper
scope of the investigations going forward, OLC memoranda justifying
enhanced interrogation techniques were leaked to the media. After
reviewing them closely, I determined that these memoranda contained
flawed and incomplete legal analysis and were, at any rate, inapplicable
to the subjects of these investigations. The Army ultimately prosecuted
cases involving not torture but “merely” unlawful, unauthorized, and
unjustified acts of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by
interrogators and guards.77
In the course of my work, it never occurred to me that erroneous
75. Id. at 1503.
76. See id. at 1502–03 (claiming OLC’s location within executive branch “does not
compel any particular understanding of the precise scope of executive power”).
77. In full disclosure, it was not possible to determine criminal responsibility for
every questionable practice or event raised by the evidence.
Additionally, the
investigations and prosecutions never established criminal responsibility for the deaths.
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OLC legal opinions, charitably described as “deeply flawed,” “sloppily
reasoned, overbroad, and incautious,”78 and less charitably as “torturing
the law,”79 might be a “source of law . . . within the executive branch.”80
My oath and professional responsibilities were to the law, not to an
erroneous legal opinion; my ethical obligation as a prosecutor was to
ensure the appropriate measure of justice for the victims and for any
potential defendants.
Upon returning to West Point, I was encouraged to see that a
monument to the Constitution had been erected a few years after I had
graduated. A plaque on that monument provides:
The United States boldly broke with the ancient military
custom of swearing loyalty to a leader. Article VI required that
American officers thereafter swear loyalty to our basic law, the
Constitution.
While many other nations have suffered military coups, the
United States never has. Our American code of military
obedience requires that, should orders and the law ever
conflict, our officers must obey the law. Many other nations
have adopted our principle of loyalty to the basic law.
This nation must have military leaders of principle and
integrity so strong that their oaths to support and defend the
Constitution will unfailingly govern their actions. The purpose
of the United States Military Academy is to provide such leaders
of character.81
It is not only our country’s military leaders who take this oath. Thus, it
may be not only OLC’s responsibility to correct or ignore legal error
rather than to perpetuate it, but also every government lawyer’s or other
official’s solemn obligation—to be diligently researched, objectively
analyzed, and judiciously exercised.

Preferred Citation: John C. Dehn, Institutional Advocacy, Constitutional
Obligations, and Professional Responsibilities: Arguments for Government
Lawyering Without Glasses, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 73 (2010),
78. Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 10.
79. Alvarez, supra note 62, at 175–78.
80. Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 1, at 1493. Although the view that OLC
opinions are binding or even “law” within the executive branch is well accepted, id. at
1464 & n.60, my doctoral work will propose the proper response of the armed forces when
those opinions sanction, and the President thereafter orders or authorizes, presumptive
violations of applicable international or domestic law in the nation’s armed conflicts.
81. A photograph of this plaque, entitled “Loyalty to the Constitution,” is available at
http://www.aogusma.org/class/1943jan/Constitution_Corner/cc.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). This monument was donated by the
Class of 1943 and, although the Academy approved its design and construction, it does
not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Military
Academy, or the United States Army.
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